Close
Calls: We Were Closer to Nuclear Destruction than We Knew
Part 1
“The
proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used —
accidentally or by decision — defies credibility”
This unanimous statement was published by the Canberra Commission in
1996. Among the commission members were internationally known former ministers
of defense and of foreign affairs and generals.
The nuclear-weapon states do not intend to abolish their nuclear
weapons. They promised to do so when they signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) of 1970. Furthermore, the International Court in The Hague
concluded in its advisory opinion more than 20 years ago that these states were
obliged to negotiate and bring to a conclusion such negotiations on complete
nuclear disarmament. The nuclear-weapon states disregard this obligation. On
the contrary, they invest enormous sums in the modernization of these weapons
of global destruction.
It is difficult today to raise a strong opinion in the nuclear-weapon
states for nuclear disarmament. One reason is that the public sees the risk of
a nuclear war between these states as so unlikely that it can be disregarded.
It is then important to remind ourselves that we were for decades,
during the Cold War, threatened by extinction by nuclear war. We were not aware
at that time how close we were. In this article I will summarize some of the
best-known critical situations. Recently published evidence shows that the
danger was considerably greater than we knew at the time.
The risk today of a nuclear omnicide—killing all or almost all
humans—is probably smaller than during the Cold War, but the risk is even today
real and it may be rising. That is the reason I wish us to remind ourselves
again: as long as nuclear weapons exist we are in danger of extermination.
Nuclear weapons must be abolished before they abolish us.
Stanislav Petrov: The man who saved the world
1983 was probably the most dangerous year for mankind ever in history.
We were twice close to a nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the USA. But
we did not know that.
The situation between the USA and the Soviet Union was very dangerous.
In his notorious speech in March 1983, President Reagan spoke of the “Axis of
Evil” states in a way that seriously upset the Soviet leaders. The speech ended
the period of mutual cooperation, which had prevailed since the Cuba crisis.
In the Soviet Union many political and military leaders were convinced
that the USA would launch a nuclear attack. Peter Handberg, a Swedish
journalist, has reported of meetings with men who at that time watched over
sites where the intercontinental missiles were stored. These men strongly
believed that an American attack was imminent and they expected a launch order.
In Moscow, the leaders of the Communist party prepared for a counter
attack. The head of the KGB, the foreign intelligence agency, General Ileg
Kalunin, had ordered his agents in the world to watch for any sign of a large
attack on the Mother Country.
A previous head of the KGB, Jurij Andropov, was now leader of the
country. He was severely ill and was treated with chronic dialysis. He was the
man ultimately responsible for giving the order to fire the nuclear missiles.
The nuclear arms race was intense. The USA and the Soviet Union were
both arming the “European Theater” with medium-distance nuclear missiles.
President Reagan’s “Star Wars” program was a source of much anxiety on the
Russian side. The belief was that the USA was trying to obtain a first strike
capacity. In Russia, a Doomsday machine was planned—a system that would
automatically launch all strategic nuclear weapons if contact with the military
and political leaders of the country was completely disabled.
Stanislov Petrov
The increased risk of war was felt particularly strongly by those in
Russia who were ordered to prepare for an immediate response in case of a
nuclear attack. The command centre situated in the military city Serpukov-15
was the hub for the vigilance, evaluating reports from satellites in space and radar
stations at the borders. Colonel Stanislav Petrov was ordered to take the watch
on the evening of September 25, instead of a colleague who had called in sick.
Late in the evening, the alarm sounded. A missile had apparently been
fired from the American west coast. Soon two were detected; finally four. The
computer warned that the probability of an attack was at the highest level.
Petrov should now, according to the instructions, immediately report
that an American attack had been discovered. Against orders, he decided to
wait. He knew that if he reported a nuclear attack a global war would be
likely. The USA, the Soviet Union, and most of mankind would be exterminated.
Petrov waited for more information.
He found it very unlikely that the USA had launched only a few
missiles. Petrov was well informed about the computer system and he knew that
it was not perfect.
After a long wait the “missiles” disappeared from the screens. The
explanation came at last: There was a glitch in the computer system.
Petrov had himself been involved in developing the system. Maybe this
special knowledge saved us? Or unusual self-confidence and courage in an
unusual individual?
This fateful event became known when a superior officer, who had
criticized omissions in Petrov’s records of the evening, told the story on his
deathbed. Petrov has received rather little recognition in Russia.
What happened that critical night—and Petrov’s part in the story—is
played out in a recent movie by the Danish producer Peter Anthony: “The man who
saved the world.”
“Able Archer”: A NATO exercise which could have become the last
Just like the “Petrov incident,” the “Able Archer” crisis was
known only to a few military and political leaders in Russia and the USA until
decades later. Only in 2013 could the Nuclear Information Service get access to
the classified US file. Important documents from Russia and Great Britain are
still not available. Why do our leaders feel they need to “protect” us against
the truth of the greatest dangers mankind has faced?
Soviet SS-20 missile
“Able Archer” was a NATO exercise carried out in the beginning of
November 1983. The purpose was so simulate a Soviet invasion stopped by a
nuclear attack. About 40,000 soldiers participated and large troop movements
took place.
Similar exercises had been carried out in previous years. The
development could be monitored by Soviet intelligence through radio
eavesdropping. What was new was that the tension between Soviet and the USA was
stronger than before. In the background was the Soviet operation RYAN, an
acronym for an attack with nuclear missiles. RYAN had become the strategic plan
of the Soviet KGB two years earlier, on how to respond to an expected American
nuclear attack. The combination of Soviet paranoia and the rhetoric of
President Ronald Reagan did place the world in great danger.
Soviet leaders thought that this exercise could be a parallel to
Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa, the military maneuver that suddenly was turned
into a full-scale attack on the Soviet Union.
The Soviet leaders placed bomb planes on highest alert, with pilots in
place in the cockpits. Submarines carrying nuclear missiles were placed in
protected positions under the Arctic ice. Missiles of the SS-20 type were
readied.
NATO concluded the exercises after a few days, with an order to launch
nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. No missiles were
fired, however, and the participants went back home.
After the exercise the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher learnt
from the intelligence service how the NATO command had been ignorant of the
serious misunderstanding in Russia of the intention of this exercise. She
conferred with President Ronald Reagan. It is likely that this information,
together with his viewing of the film “The Day After,” caused the conversion of
the President which was expressed in his State of the Union message in 1984: “A
nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Reagan continued this process
up to the famous meeting in Reykjavik in 1986, when he and President Gorbachev
for a brief moment agreed to abolish all nuclear weapons before the end of the
century.
An interesting and most worrying rendition of how the exercises were
perceived in Russia is given in the documentary movie “1983: Brink of the
Apocalypse.” The story is based on documents that became available in 2013 and
on interviews with some of those who were active on both sides in the
situation. Two spies were important in convincing the leaders of KGB that no
attack was underway. One was a Russian spy in NATO headquarters who insisted to
the KGB that this was an exercise and not a preparation for an attack. The
other, a Russian spy in London, gave the same picture.
We can conclude that a lack of insight in the USA and in NATO into the
perceptions in the Soviet Union put the world in mortal danger. Did two spies
save the world?
A reflection of the danger associated with this NATO exercise plays out
in the recent German TV production “Deutschland.”
The Cuba crisis: More dangerous than we knew
Soviet nuclear weapons were placed in Cuba. Fidel Castro and Russia’s
generals intended to use them if the USA attacked. A Russian submarine that
came under attack carried a nuclear weapon. A nuclear attack on the US was
closer than we knew.
The development of this crisis has been described in several American
books. “Thirteen Days” by Robert Kennedy is the best known and has also been
made into a movie. As the story is so well known I will not repeat it here.
In the reports, we can experience how badly prepared the political and
military leadership were for such a situation, and how little these two groups
understood each other. The generals saw no alternatives other than doing
nothing or destroying Cuba with a full-scale nuclear attack. Robert Kennedy
wrote that he even feared a military coup!
The US side had little information about plans and evaluations in
Moscow. There was no direct communication between Kennedy and Khrushchev.
The final Russian answer to President Kennedy’s proposal was sent from
the Russian Embassy to Kennedy by a bicycle messenger! (The “Hot line” was
installed after—and because of—the Cuban Missile Crisis).
We know less about what went on in Moscow, but Khrushchev’s memoirs
give some information. It seems that the Russian generals were greatly worried
about the image and prestige of Russia. “If we give in to the US in this
situation how could our allies trust us in the future. How could the Chinese
have any respect for us?”
The world knew at the time that the crisis was very dangerous and that
a nuclear war was a real possibility. Decades later we know more. Thus, Cuban
President Fidel Castro, at a meeting many years later with US Secretary of
Defense McNamara, said that if the USA had attacked Cuba, Castro would have
demanded that Russian nuclear missiles be launched against the USA.
An American U-2 spy plane was shot down over Cuba during the crisis.
Only much later were we informed that another U-2 plane in the Arctic had
entered over Soviet territory, misled by the influence of the Northern Light!
US fighter planes were sent to protect the U-2 plane. These planes were
equipped with nuclear weapons for this mission. Why? Was it possible for the
lone pilot to launch these weapons?
We have also belatedly learned that four Russian submarines carrying
nuclear torpedoes were navigating close to Cuba. The commanders were instructed
to use their nuclear weapons if bombs seriously damaged their vessel. At least
one of the submarines was hit by charges that were intended as warnings, but
the commander did not know this. The captain believed his submarine was damaged
and he wanted to launch his nuclear torpedo. His deputy, Captain Vasilij
Alexandrovich Arkhipov, persuaded him to wait for an order from Moscow. No
connection was established but the submarine escaped. Arkhipov’s role has been
highlighted in a movie which, like the film about Petrov, is called “The man
who saved the world.”
What would have been the consequence had the nuclear torpedo hit the US
aircraft carrier that led the US operation?
Quite recently, reports have surfaced from the US base on Okinawa,
Japan. During the Cuba crisis the order came to prepare for a nuclear attack
against the Soviet Union. There was considerable confusion at the nuclear
command at the base. An increase in the alarm level from DefCon-2 to DefCon-1
was expected but never came.
A bizarre event, which could have been come from a novel by John le
Carré, was called “Penkovsky’s sighs.” Oleg Penkovsky was a double agent who
had given important information to the CIA—the US Central Intelligence
Agency—about the Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba. He had been instructed to send
a coded message—three deep exhalations repeated twice—to his contact were he
informed that the Soviets intended to attack. This sighing message was sent
during the Cuba crisis to the CIA. The CIA contact, however, realized that
Penkovsky had been captured and tortured and the code had been extricated.
Other serious close calls
In November 1979, a recorded scenario describing a Russian nuclear
attack had been entered into the US warning system NORAD. The scenario was
perceived as a real full-scale Soviet attack. Nuclear missiles and bombers were
readied. After six minutes the mistake became obvious. After this incident new
security routines were introduced.
Despite these changed routines, less that one year later the mistake
was repeated—this time more persistent and dangerous. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the
US national security adviser, was called at three o´clock in the morning by a
general on duty. He was informed that 220 Soviet missiles were on their way
towards the USA. A moment later a new call came, saying that 2,200 missiles had
been launched. Brzezinski was about to call President Jimmy Carter when the
general called for a third time reporting that the alarm had been cancelled.
The mistake was caused by a malfunctioning computer chip. Several
similar false alarms have been reported, although they did not reach the
national command.
We have no reports from the Soviet Union similar to these computer
malfunctions. Maybe the Russians have less trust in their computers, just as
Colonel Petrov showed? However, there are many reports on serious accidents in
the manufacture and handling of nuclear weapons. I have received reliable
information from senior military officers in the Soviet Union regarding heavy
use of alcohol and drugs among the personnel that monitor the warning and
control systems, just as in the USA.
The story of the “Norwegian weather rocket” in 1995 is often presented
as a particularly dangerous incident. Russians satellites warned of a missile
on its way from Norway towards Russia. President Yeltsin was called in the
middle of the night; the “nuclear war laptop” was opened; and the president
discussed the situation with his staff. The “missile” turned out not to be
directed towards Russia.
I see this incident as an indication that when the relations between
the nuclear powers are good, then the risk of a misunderstanding is very small.
The Russians were not likely to expect an attack at that time.
Indian soldiers fire artillery in northernmost part of Kargil region.
Close calls have occurred not only between the two superpowers. India
and Pakistan are in a chronic but active conflict regarding Kashmir. At least
twice this engagement has threatened to expand into a nuclear war, namely at
the Kargil conflict in 1999 and after an attack on the Indian Parliament by
Pakistani terrorists in 2001. Both times, Pakistan readied nuclear weapons for
delivery. Pakistan has a doctrine of first use: If Indian military forces
transgress over the border to Pakistan, that country intends to use nuclear
weapons. Pakistan does not have a system with a “permissive link”, where a code
must be transmitted from the highest authority in order to make a launch of
nuclear weapons possible. Military commanders in Pakistan have the technical
ability to use nuclear weapons without the approval of the political leaders in
the country. India, with much stronger conventional forces, uses the permissive
link and has declared a “no first use” principle.
The available extensive reports from both these incidents show that the
communication between the political and the military leaders was highly
inadequate. Misunderstandings on very important matters occurred to an alarming
degree. During both conflicts between India and Pakistan, intervention by US
leaders was important in preventing escalation and a nuclear war.
We know little about close calls in the other nuclear-weapon states.
The UK prepared its nuclear weapons for use during the Cuba conflict. There
were important misunderstandings between military and political leaders during
that incident. Today all British nuclear weapons are based on submarines. The
missiles can, as a rule, be launched only after a delay of many hours. Mistakes
will thus be much less likely.
France, on the contrary, claims that it has parts of its nuclear
arsenal ready for immediate action, on order from the President. There are no
reports of close calls. There is no reason to label the collision between a
British and French nuclear-armed submarine in 2009 as a close call.
China has a “no first use” doctrine and probably does not have weapons
on hair-trigger alert, which decreases the risk of dangerous mistakes.
Why was there no nuclear war?
Eric Schlosser, author of the book “Command and Control,” told this
story: “An elderly physicist, who had taken part in the development of the
nuclear weapons, told me: ‘If anyone had said in 1945, after the bombing of
Nagasaki, that no other city in the world would be attacked with atomic
weapons, no one would have believed him. We expected more nuclear wars.’”
Yes, how come there was no more nuclear war?
In the nuclear-weapon states they say that deterrence was the reason.
MAD—“Mutual Assured Destruction”—saved us. Even if I attack first, the other
side will have sufficient weapons left to cause “unacceptable” damage to my
country. So I won’t do it.
Deterrence was important. In addition, the “nuclear winter” concept was
documented in the mid-1980s. The global climate consequences of a major nuclear
war would be so severe that the “winner” would starve to death. An attack would
be suicidal. Maybe this insight contributed to the decrease in nuclear arsenals
that started after 1985?
MAD cannot explain why nuclear weapons were not used in wars against
countries that did not have them. In the Korean war, General MacArthur wanted
to use nuclear weapons against the Chinese forces that came in on the North
Korean side but he was stopped by President Truman. During the Vietnam war many
voices in the USA demanded that nukes should be used. In the two wars against
Iraq the US administration threatened to use nuclear weapons if Iraq used
chemical weapons. Many Soviet military leaders wanted to use atomic bombs in
Afghanistan.
What held them back? Most important were moral and humanitarian
reasons. This was called the “Nuclear Threshold.” If the USA had used nuclear
weapons against North Vietnam the results would have been so terrible that the
US would have been a pariah country for decades. The domestic opinion in the US
would not have accepted the bombing. Furthermore, the radioactive fallout in
neighbouring countries, some of them allies to the US, would have been
unacceptable.
Are moral and humanitarian reasons a sufficient explanation why nukes
were never used? I do not know, but find no other.
Civil society organisations have been important in establishing a high
nuclear threshold. International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
has been particularly important in this regard. IPPNW has persistently pointed
at the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and warned that a global
nuclear war could end human civilisation and, maybe, exterminate mankind. The
opinion by the International Court in The Hague, that the use or threat of use
of nuclear weapons was generally prohibited, is also important.
The nuclear-weapon states do not intend to use nuclear weapons except
as deterrence against attack. Deterrence, however, works only if the enemy
believes that, in the end, I am prepared to use nuclear weapons. Both NATO and
Russia have doctrines that nukes can be used even if the other side has not
done so. In a conflict of great importance, a side that is much weaker and
maybe is in danger of being overrun is likely to threaten to use its atomic
weapons. If you threaten to use them you may in the end be forced to follow
through on your threat.
The close calls I have described in this article mean that mankind
could have been exterminated by mistake. Only decades after the events have we
been allowed to learn about these threats. It is likely that equally dangerous
close calls have occurred.
So why did these mistakes not lead to a nuclear war, when during the
Cold War the tension was so high and the superpowers seemed to have expected a
nuclear war to break out?
Let me tell of a close call I have experienced in my personal life. I
was driving on a highway, in the middle of the day, when I felt that the urge
to fall asleep, which sometimes befalls me, was about to overpower my
vigilance. There was no place to stop for a rest. After a minute I fell asleep.
The car veered against the partition in the middle of the road and its side was
torn up. My wife and I were unharmed.
But if there had been no banister? The traffic on the opposing side of
the road was heavy and there were lorries.
The nuclear close calls did not lead to a war. Those who study
accidents say that often there must be two and often three mistakes or failures
occurring simultaneously.
There have been a sufficient number of dangerous situations between the
USA and Russia that could have happened at almost the same time. Shortly before
the Able Archer exercise, a Korean passenger plane was shot down by Soviet
airplanes. But what if Soviet fighters had, by mistake, been attacked and shot
down over Europe? What if any of the American airplanes carrying nuclear
weapons had mistaken the order in the exercise for a real order to bomb Soviet
targets? In the Soviet Union bombers were on high alert, with pilots in the
cockpit, waiting for a US attack.
What if the fighters sent to protect the U-2 plane that had strayed
into Soviet territory in Siberia during the Cuba crisis had used the nuclear
missile they were carrying?
Eric Schlosser tells in his book about a great number of mistakes and
accidents in the handling of nuclear weapons in the USA. Bombs have fallen from
airplanes or crashed with the carrier. These accidents would not cause a
nuclear war, but a nuclear explosion during a tense international crisis when
something else also went wrong, such as the “Petrov Incident” mentioned
earlier, could have led to very dangerous mistakes. Terrorist attacks with
nuclear weapons simultaneous with a large cyber attack might start the final
war, if the political situation is strained.
Dr. Alan Philips guessed in a study from the year 2003 that the risk of
a nuclear war occurring during the Cold War was 40%. Maybe so. Or maybe 20%. Or
75%. But most definitely not zero—not close to zero.
Today the danger of a nuclear war between Russia and the USA is much
lower that during the Cold War. However, mistakes can happen. Dr. Bruce Blair,
who has been in the chain of command for nuclear weapons, insists that
unauthorized firing of nuclear missiles is possible. The protection is not
perfect. In general, the system for control and for launching is built to
function with great redundancy, whatever happens to the lines of command or to
the command centers. The controls against launches by mistake, equipment
failure, interception by hackers, technical malfunction, or human madness, seem
to have a lower priority. At least in the US, but there is no reason to believe
the situation in Russia to be more secure.
The tension between Russia and the USA is increasing. Threats of use of
nuclear weapons have, unbelievably, been heard.
But we have been lucky so far.
As I said in the beginning of this paper, quoting the Canberra
Commission: “The proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity
and never used — accidentally or by decision — defies credibility. The only
complete defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance that they
will never be produced again.”
The most important source for this review is the Chatham House Report
from 2014 “Too close for comfort.”
The original source of this article is International
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
Copyright © Gunnar Westberg, International
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War , 2016
/https://www.niagarafallsreview.ca/content/dam/thestar/news/canada/2021/09/25/huawei-executive-meng-wanzhou-receives-warm-welcome-upon-return-to-china/_1_meng_wanzhou_2.jpg)
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