Trump and Afghanistan: A Hidden Agenda
If you not sad to see Bannon leave, you must answer
yourself a question: Is there any reasonable people left on the team?
On Monday 21 August 2017 US President Trump made his
long awaited statement on future US policy in Afghanistan. There was
considerable speculation beforehand that as to whether Trump might announce a
US withdrawal. The basis for that speculation appeared to be various statements
that Trump had made both before and during his candidacy for the presidency.
Even closer to the time of the speech there was
further speculation that he would announce an increase of 4000 US troops. The
basis for that speculation appeared to be leaks from unspecified sources.
In the event the speech was an anticlimax. Although
Trump conceded that his views had changed, there was essentially no change to
US policy. Any change would have been a surprise as there are long established
continuities as to US foreign policy generally, and in this case to
Afghanistan.
The only voice in the administration making a
different case was Steve Bannon, and his departure the previous week confirmed
not only that there would be no change in policy, but that the takeover of the
administration by the generals was now complete. Trumps three closest advisers
on national security matters, Kelly, McMaster and Mattis have never shown the
least interest in a reduced American military footprint anywhere in the world,
much less in Afghanistan.
The figure of 4000 extra troops, although not
specified by Trump, nonetheless remains the favoured figure by most
commentators. Quite why this number would make any significant difference has
never been explained. It is significantly fewer troops than the more than
100,000 the Americans had at the height of their troop engagement, and that
number was conspicuously unable to defeat the Taliban or even exercise
effective control over more than a small percentage of the country.
Trump’s statement and the mainstream commentaries
that have followed have barely mentioned if at all the more than 100,000
mercenaries that are operating in Afghanistan. Perhaps because their role is
unencumbered by the normal rules of engagement they enjoy a media silence that
is inconsistent with informed debate and discussion about an effective resolution
of what is transparently an unwinnable quagmire.
There were two policy elements in Trump’s speech
that are worth a further comment. The first was his disclaimer that the United
States was engaged in “nation building” but rather was there “to kill terrorists.”
Apart from the inherent implausibility of this claim, it creates difficulties
for allies such as Australia whose politicians continue to sell this unpopular
enterprise on the equally implausible claim that they are there to “train”
Afghan troops to a level of self-sufficiency. This claim is maintained in the
face of overwhelming evidence that after several years of such “training” the
Afghan army remains a byword for corruption, “ghost” soldiers, and a compete
inability to sustain any kind of effective military combat.
The second point in Trump’s speech worth noting is
that he said that the Rules of engagement would be relaxed. The detail was not
specified, but such terminology usually prefaces the commission of war crimes
and a war in which civilians are the main casualties. The Afghan civilian
population has already suffered years of bombing, drone attacks and being
experimental guinea pigs for the first ever use of the so-called ‘mother of all
bombs’. The military efficacy of that particular attack has never been
revealed.
In short, there was no substantive change at all in
Trump’s policy announcement. Nor was there ever likely to be as US policy in
Afghanistan is part of a consistent policy being played out around the world.
Only some of the details vary to reflect particular local circumstances.
In Afghanistan’s case there are three principal
local conditions, an understanding of which is critical to any realistic
appraisal of US policy in Afghanistan. Unsurprisingly, none of these conditions
have featured in mainstream analysis of Trumps’ speech.
The first of these is the issue of resources. As
even the New York Times acknowledged (25 July 2017) a 2014 report estimated
that Afghanistan had as much as $1 trillion of untapped mineral deposits. These
mineral resources include rare earth minerals that are essential to a range of
high-tech products. At present, China has a virtual monopoly of these valuable
resources.
A related resource issue is control of the oil and
gas pipeline from the enormous reserves of the Caspian basin. It was the US’s
failure to secure the contract for this pipeline in July 2001 that was the
reason for the October 2001 invasion, not the fictional narrative of hunting
for Osama bin Laden.
The second major issue revolves around the
long-standing US policy of confronting China, Iran and Russia. Iran and China
share a border with Afghanistan, and three former Soviet republics,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, also border it.
All three of those latter countries have a significant
Muslim population, 89%, 79% and 98% respectively. They are therefore prime
targets for ISIS and other proxy terrorist groups. It is not a coincidence that
ISIS began to play a significant role in Afghanistan at precisely the time when
the Taliban were reasserting control over the majority of the country.
The use of terrorist proxy groups in support of US
geopolitical objectives in the region date at least from the 1970s when under
Operation Cyclone Mujihideen were trained and armed by the Americans for
infiltration into Afghanistan, China’s Xinjiang province (also with a
significant Muslim population) and the aforementioned former Soviet republics.
The Mujihideen el Khalq (MEK) have similarly been used to destabilize Iran.
The third local condition of significance is that
Afghanistan supplies 93% of the world’s heroin according to the UN Drug Agency.
Opium production, from which heroin is derived, had virtually ceased under the
Taliban prior to the invasion in 2001. Production rebounded under American and
allied patronage reaching a new record level in 2016.
The use of illegal narcotics to finance CIA and
other clandestine operations is well documented (Alfred McCoy The Politics of
Heroin 1972, 2003; Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil and War 2003; Scott, American
War Machine 2010). Heroin addiction is used as a means of destabilizing target
countries, and Russia and Iran have significant addiction problems as a
consequence.
Trump’s speech was vague on details, and this was
deliberately so. Any discussion of details would risk exposing the whole fabric
of deceit upon which the last 16 years of invasion and occupation have been
built.
The real underlying message in Trump’s statement was
that the US would persist in its policies in the region. Given the above factors,
that will inevitably lead to a confrontation with Russia, Iran and China.
Last week the Russian Foreign Ministry issued two
statements drawing attention to two areas of major concern to the Russian
Federation. The first of these were the activities of unidentified helicopters
flying from an Afghan national air base in Mazar-i-Sharif and being used to
attack Hazara Shia Muslims without any interference from NATO forces that have
total control of Afghan air space.
The second statement drew attention to Afghanistan’s
drug cultivation and noted that tonnes of chemicals essential for processing
opium into heroin were flown from Italy, France and the Netherlands. All three
are NATO countries, and again there was no interdiction by NATO forces. Neither
statement received any coverage in the western mainstream media.
At a meeting in Moscow on 18 July 2017 of Russia’s
top military command, the Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu said that the conflict
in Afghanistan poses a threat to the stability of Central Asia. Any move by
ISIS into the Central Asian republics would, said Russia’s Ambassador to
Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov, invite a Russian military response.
China is also alarmed, not only because of the
ongoing threat posed by the infiltration of proxy terrorist groups into
sensitive areas in south-western China, but also because one of the US’s real
objectives is to disrupt China’s enormous One Belt, One Road (OBOR) projects
that are transforming countries in the region.
Pakistan is a key component of that project, including
through the $45 billion China-Pakistan-Economic Corridor (CPEC) that terminates
in the Pakistani (but Chinese controlled) port of Gwador. It is likely that
Pakistan’s role in OBOR is the real reason for the threats Trump uttered
against Pakistan, rather than their alleged role in supporting the Taliban.
If Trump was serious about bringing about an end to
the Afghan conflict he would have taken advantage of the Russian sponsored
peace talks with all the other interested parties earlier this year. His
failure to do so, and now a speech devoid of real policy substance, but
promising more of the same old failed policies, is a truer indication of
America’s real intentions.
James
O’Neill, an Australian-based Barrister at Law, exclusively for the online
magazine “New Eastern
Outlook”.
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