The
Little-Known Company That Enables Worldwide Mass Surveillance
Ryan
Gallagher, Nicky Hager
October 23 2016, 9:19 a.m.
IT WAS A POWERFUL piece of technology created for an important customer. The Medusa
system, named after the mythical Greek monster with snakes instead of hair, had
one main purpose: to vacuum up vast quantities of internet data at an
astonishing speed.
The
technology was designed by Endace, a little-known New Zealand company. And the
important customer was the British electronic eavesdropping agency, Government
Communications Headquarters, or GCHQ.
Dozens of
internal documents and emails from Endace, obtained by The Intercept and
reported in cooperation with Television New Zealand, reveal the firm’s key role helping governments
across the world harvest vast amounts of information on people’s private
emails, online chats, social media conversations, and internet browsing
histories.
The leaked
files, which were provided by a source through SecureDrop, show that Endace listed a Moroccan security agency implicated in
torture as one of its customers. They also indicate that the company sold its
surveillance gear to more than half a dozen other government agencies,
including in the United States, Israel, Denmark, Australia, Canada, Spain, and
India.
Some of
Endace’s largest sales in recent years, however, were to the United Kingdom’s
GCHQ, which purchased a variety of “data acquisition” systems and “probes” that
it used to covertly monitor internet traffic.
Documents
from the National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden, previously disclosed by The Intercept, have shown how GCHQ
dramatically expanded its online surveillance between 2009 and 2012. The newly
obtained Endace documents add to those revelations, shining light for the first
time on the vital role played by the private sector in enabling the spying.
Stuart
Wilson, Endace’s CEO, declined to answer questions for this story. Wilson said
in a statement that Endace’s technology “generates significant export revenue
for New Zealand and builds important technical capability for our country.” He
added: “Our commercial technology is used by customers worldwide … who rely on
network recording to protect their critical infrastructure and data from
cyber criminals, terrorists, and state-sponsored cyber security threats.”
Former Endace Director Ian Graham, right, meets New Zealand Prime
Minister John Key in 2010
Photo:
NZNationalParty/Flickr
ENDACE SAYS IT manufactures technology that allows its clients to “monitor,
intercept and capture 100% of traffic on networks.” The Auckland-based
company’s motto is “power to see all” and its logo is an eye.
The company’s
origins can be traced back to Waikato University in Hamilton, New Zealand.
There, in 1994, a team of professors and researchers began developing network
monitoring technology using university resources. A central aim of the project
was to find ways to measure different kinds of data on the internet, which was
at that time only just beginning to take off. Within a few years, the
academics’ efforts proved successful; they had managed to invent pioneering
network monitoring tools. By 2001, the group behind the research started
commercializing the technology — and Endace was formed.
Today, Endace
presents itself publicly as focused on providing technology that helps
companies and governments keep their networks secure. But in the past decade,
it has quietly entered into a burgeoning global spy industry that is worth in
excess of an estimated $5 billion annually.
In 2007,
Endace representatives promoted their technology at a huge surveillance
technology trade show in Dubai that was attended by dozens of government
agencies from across the world. Endace’s advertising brochures from the show,
which described the company’s products and promoted the need for greater state
surveillance, were published by WikiLeaks in 2013.
One Endace
brochure explained how the company’s technology could help clients “monitor all
network traffic inexpensively.” It noted that telecommunications networks carry
many types of information: Skype calls, videos, emails, and instant message
chats. “These networks provide rich intelligence for law enforcement,” the
brochure stated, “IF they can be accessed securely and with high precision.”
Workers lay undersea cables near Hiddensee Island, Germany.
Photo:
Ullstein Bild/Getty Images
THE UNITED KINGDOM’S geographic location — situated between North America, mainland
Europe, and the Middle East — made it a good market for Endace.
Many major
international undersea data cables cross British territory, and according to top-secret documents from Snowden, as much as 25 percent of all the
world’s internet traffic flows through the U.K. The country’s spies have worked
to exploit this, with GCHQ tapping into as many of the cables as it can,
sifting through huge volumes of emails, instant messages, social media
interactions, and web browsing records as they are being transmitted across the
internet.
As of 2009,
GCHQ’s surveillance of undersea cables was well underway. The agency was
measuring the amount of traffic it monitored in tens of gigabits per second
(10Gs) — the equivalent in data of about 1 million average-sized emails every
minute. The electronic eavesdropping agency was tapping into 87 different 10Gs
capacity cables and funneling the collected data into its processing systems
for analysis.
By March
2011, GCHQ’s aim was to tap into 415 of the 10Gs cables, and its longer-term
goal was to “grow our internet access to 800 10Gs.” The agency wanted to build what it described as the
largest covert surveillance apparatus in the world. And in an effort to fulfill
that plan, it turned to Endace’s technology.
Leaked
documents and emails from Endace, obtained by The Intercept, lay out a series
of deals the company made with GCHQ to help it broaden its mass surveillance
capabilities. A confidential February 2010 Endace statement of work for GCHQ, for instance, outlined a £245,000
($299,500) deal to upgrade “monitoring solutions” for the British agency that
were designed to intercept large amounts of internet traffic and send it into
“memory holes” — repositories used to store the data.
The agency wanted to build the largest covert surveillance apparatus in
the world.
Between
November 2010 and March 2011, GCHQ purchased more technology from Endace,
including specialized surveillance technology built for “FGA only,” a code name
the company often uses in its internal documents to refer to GCHQ; it stands
for “friendly government agency.”
A November
2010 company document said that “FGA” had an order of 20 systems
scheduled for delivery in March 2011. Each system was equipped with two “data
acquisition” cards capable of intercepting 20Gs of internet traffic. The total
capacity of the order would enable GCHQ to monitor a massive amount of data —
the equivalent of being able to download 3,750 high-definition movies every
minute, or 2.5 billion average-sized emails an hour.
Endace added
in the document that “a potential for 300-500 systems over the next two to
three years is being discussed” and noted that it was soon anticipating another
order of “30-40 additional systems.” Indeed, the following month a new $167,940 purchase order for 27 more systems arrived, and the items were
swiftly dispatched for delivery to GCHQ’s headquarters in Cheltenham, England.
The records
of the Endace sales are confirmed by internal GCHQ documents, provided by Snowden, which describe the company’s
data capture devices being used as part of mass surveillance programs. GCHQ
documents from 2010 and 2011 repeatedly mention the Endace products while
discussing the capture of “internet-derived” data to extract information about
people’s usage of services such as Gmail, Hotmail, WhatsApp, and Facebook.
GCHQ declined
to comment for this story.
An Endace diagram depicts a custom data capture system built for GCHQ.
Photo:
Endance
THROUGHOUT THE SUMMER of 2011, at Endace’s offices in Auckland, New Zealand, the orders
from GCHQ were continuing to flow in. Meanwhile, the company’s engineers were
busy turning their sights to new technology that could vastly increase
surveillance capability. Endace was developing a powerful new product for GCHQ
called Medusa: interception equipment that could capture internet traffic at up
to 100 gigabits per second.
Medusa was
first logged in Endace’s sales systems in September 2011. Endace staff produced weekly status reports about their progress and updated GCHQ at
biweekly review meetings. By November 18, 2011, the first version of
Medusa arrived at GCHQ. “FGA are very pleased with the prototypes we delivered
last week,” Endace noted.
Apparently
after testing the Medusa prototype, GCHQ requested some refinements. One feature the agency wanted was called “Separate MAC insertion by IP type.”
This suggests the British agency may have sought the ability to target
individuals by searching internet traffic for the built-in hardware address of
their computers, routers, or phones.
Notably, the
Medusa status reports reveal that Endace was using taxpayers’ money to develop
the new equipment for GCHQ. They state that the Medusa system was being built
for “FGA” with funding from the Foundation of Research Science and Technology,
the body that handed out New Zealand government research grants.
In 2010,
Endace received two grants totaling $11.1 million. A public announcement
for the first grant — issued in July 2010 — said the funding was for “50% of
the cost of a series of substantial product developments over the next two
years,” but did not say what the products were nor who they were for.
A New Zealand
government spokesperson told The Intercept that he could not immediately give a
“definitive” answer on whether the funding body had known Endace would use the
grants to develop surveillance technology for GCHQ, but said it was “highly
unlikely Endace would have provided that information, as they were under no
obligation to do so.”
Endace has
never publicly disclosed any of its work with GCHQ, likely because it is
subject to strict confidentiality agreements. In one contractobtained by The Intercept, GCHQ states that Endace
staff are bound to the U.K.’s Official Secrets Act, a sweeping law that can be
used to prosecute and imprison people who disclose classified information. GCHQ
warned Endace that it must not “make any press announcements or publicize the
contract or any part thereof in any way.”
The back of two satellite antennae at GCHQ’s surveillance base in Bude,
England.
Photo:
Education Images/UIG/Getty Images
ENDACE’S LEAKED CLIENT lists show three main categories of customers: governments,
telecommunications companies, and finance companies.
The
government clients appear to be mostly intelligence agencies. A 2008 Endace
customer list included: GCHQ; the Canadian and Australian defense departments
(where their electronic spy agencies are located); a U.S. government contractor
called Rep-Tron Systems Group, located in Baltimore, Maryland; and Morocco’s
domestic surveillance agency, the DGST.
Other Endace
customer lists contained in the leaked trove include the U.S. Army and the U.S.
Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, called SPAWAR; the Israeli
Ministry of Defense (home of its Unit 8200 electronic spy agency); the
government of India, the Spanish Ministry of Defense; and Denmark’s Defense
Intelligence Service.
Endace’s
apparent dealings with the Moroccan agency, the DGST, are particularly
controversial. Moroccan authorities have been persistently accused over more
than five decades of committing a range of severe human rights abuses.
In Morocco, digital surveillance is intimately linked with repression of
peaceful dissent.
Amnesty
International, in a 2015 report, specifically singled out the DGST agency as a key
perpetrator of recent abuses, accusing it of detaining people incommunicado and
using brutal torture methods that included beatings, electric shocks, sexual
violence, simulated drowning, drugging, mock executions, and food and sleep
deprivation.
Sirine
Rached, Amnesty’s North Africa researcher, told The Intercept that sales of
surveillance technology to Morocco raised major concerns.
“In Morocco,
digital surveillance is intimately linked with repression of peaceful dissent —
people who are peacefully protesting or criticizing the authorities face
intimidation, arrest, unfair trials, and sometimes imprisonment,” said Rached.
“We fear that the more that these surveillance tools are sold [to Moroccan
agencies], the more we will see human rights abuses, especially in relation to
freedom of expression and information.”
Endace
declined to comment on its dealings with Morocco. Stuart Wilson, Endace’s CEO,
claimed in a statement that he had to keep details about the company’s
customers confidential in order to help them “battle cyberthreats and
breaches.”
An Endace “data acquisition and generation” card, used to monitor
networks.
Photo: Endace
ALONGSIDE ITS GOVERNMENT clients, Endace has many major corporate
customers.
Endace’s
sales lists include finance industry giants such as Morgan Stanley, Reuters, and
Bank of America. Endace’s website says it provides financial companies with its
monitoring technology to help “high-frequency traders to monitor, measure, and
analyze critical network environments.”
In addition,
Endace sells its equipment to some of the world’s largest telecommunications
companies, among them AT&T, AOL, Verizon, Sprint, Cogent Communications,
Telstra, Belgacom, Swisscom, Deutsche Telekom, Telena Italy, Vastech South
Africa, and France Telecom.
Some of these
companies may use the Endace equipment for checking the security of their
networks. But a key strand of Endace’s business involves providing technology
for telecommunications firms that enables law enforcement and intelligence
agencies to intercept the messages and data of phone and internet users.
A company product strategy document from 2010 said that Endace had “seen early
success” providing a Lawful Intercept product to the major U.S. telco and
internet company Sprint Corporation.
All telcos
and internet companies in the U.S., Europe, New Zealand, and a number of other
countries are required by law to have “intercept capable” equipment on their
networks. When police or spy agencies want private data about a customer (with
or without a warrant, depending on the country), it can be extracted easily.
When
installed on a network, Endace’s surveillance equipment can be used to perform
targeted monitoring of individual people, but it can also be used to enable
dragnet spying.
In one of the
leaked Endace documents obtained by The Intercept — under a section titled
“customer user stories” — the company describes a situation in which a government agency has
obtained “the encryption keys for a well-known program.” An Endace surveillance
“probe,” the document suggests, could help the government agency “unencrypt all
packets sent by this program on a large network in the last 24 hours.”
Once the data
has been decrypted, the agency will be able to “look for the text string
‘Domino’s Pizza,’” Endace joked, “as they have information suggesting this is
the favorite pizza of international terrorists.”
———
Documents published with this article:
RELATED
CONTACT THE AUTHOR:
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.